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I.FORECASTING AS A GOAL OF RESEARCH
The forecasting of economic affairs has fascinated successive gen-
erations. Once economists began to think of 'crises' as a phase of
a recurring movement, explorations of periodicity in business fluc-
tuations followed naturally. Imaginative men reasoned that since
business activity was wavelike, the time span of the waves might
well be uniform, and in that event it should be possible to predict
the coming of booms and depressions just as confidently as the
hour of sunrise or sunset. In 1829 an American writer noted the
opinion "entertained by many that every fourteen years or there-
abouts, there is a sort of revolution in property—that real estate,
especially, undergoes a speculative rise and fall, and that conse-
quently wealth becomes transferred from one individual to an-
other, by the mere operation of time." In 1844 J. B. Turner,
another American, declared that "revulsions in commerce have
become a sort of. ..epidemic...whoseperiods and returns can
be safely affirmed by all, while the shrewd financier is tolerably
aware of their precise times." When Jevons published his famous
papers on crises and sunspots, a considerable English literature
already existed on the periodic hypothesis, the most interesting of
the early writers being Hyde Clark, who a century ago speculated
on the existence of two economic cycles__one decennial, the other
a full Kondratieff wave of fifty-four years.
With the increasing application of mathematical methods to
economic data, hypotheses of periodic fluctuations proliferated in
later years. Periodicities of forty months, seven years, eight years,
ten years, and many others were repeatedly suggested. The failure
of the simple periodic hypothesis to stand up under close factual
scrutiny led to refinements. For example, Samuel Benner allowed
cycles to vary in length, but insisted that they come in sets that
are themselves repeated. In 1878, the year in which Jevons first
announced his sunspot theory to the English public, Benner had
the first opportunity to see that his own periodic scheme, which
for a while worked marvelously and brought him great renown,
could yield false as well as true prophecies of the price of iron.
Nevertheless, the line of thinking followed by Benner appealed
Reprinted from Twenty-seventh Annual Report of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (March 1947),pp.3-27.
1 Thisand the preceding quotation are from Harry E. Miller, Banking Theories
in the United States before i86o (Harvard University Press, 1927),pp.192,193.
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to some economists, while others speculated, as had Hyde Clark
before them, on the existence of several or many cycles running a
simultaneous course. As the scope of economic statistics expanded
and the irregularity of successive business cycles impressed itself
on observers, interest shifted increasingly to the study of sequences
—that is, to a search for repetitive leads or lags among different
activities. More recently still, the Keynesian consumption func-
tion, tied to estimates of private investment and the governmental
deficit, has become the pillar of forecasting techniques.
Practically every forecasting device ever suggested has occasion-
ally proved successful. But it does not appear that any method has
as yet yielded, for any long period, consistently good predictions of
changes in business activity. This unsatisfactory record is not
peculiar to business cycle forecasting. Werner Sombart begins the
last chapter of his Hochkapitalismus with these words: "The pre-
diction of the future is always a hazardous affair. And in the sphere
of economic and social history it seems to be especially dangerous.
It is precisely the most gifted men who have made the most funda-
mental mistakes." With this warning to the reader behind him,
Sombart at once plunges into an account of what economic or-
ganization will be like in the future. He is not deterred by the
experience of his great predecessors—Ricardo, Mill, Marx, Schmol-
ler, and many others. And, of course, Sombart does merely what
every one of us is always doing. If forecasts go awry, we do not stop
forecasting. We merely try to profit by our own and others' mis-
takes, or as we commonly put it—'to learn by experience.' And
there is little else that we can do. Prediction is inseparable from
life. All human activity—whether within or outside the economic
sphere—inevitably reflects forecasts of the future, mingled with
current pressures and past commitments. The forecasts are some-
times bold, definite, and comprehensive; more often they are hesi-
tant, amorphous, uttered instinctively—if at all. The choice before
man is not whether to engage in forecasting or to abstain from it,
but whether to base expectations on 'hunches' or on lessons care-
fully distilled from experience.
Systematic analysis of actual economic experience has been the
principal objective of the National Bureau and other research or-
ganizations. Investigators affiliated with a center of economic re-
search can draw on a large and growing body of factual data; they
may count on clerical and computing assistance in developing new
information; most important of all, they find colleagues working
on cognate problems and possessing skills that complement their
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own. Investigators thus equipped are in a better position to cross-
examine history effectively than the scholar who relies entirely on
his own strength. If they use their opportunities properly, they
should offer increasingly sound testimony not only on the regular
and repetitive features of experience, but also on history's discon-
certing habit of springing surprises. In this report I shall illustrate
the contribution that the National Bureau is making to this great
purpose, by commenting briefly on our recent investigations.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL INCOME
For my first illustration I draw on Simon Kuznets' work on in-
come distribution. In National Income: A Summary of Findings,
published last year, Kuznets shows succinctly how our national
income during the twenty years between the two world wars was
divided among the factors of production, among individuals,
among different industries, and among different uses. About two-
thirds of the nation's income accrued to employees, another sixth
to proprietors; the remaining sixth was paid out as rent, interest,
and dividends, in roughly similar proportions. The top 1 per cent
of the income recipients enjoyed about an eighth, and the top5
per cent about a fourth, of the nation's income. Manufacturing
accounted for about a fifth of the total, mining for a fiftieth, agri-
culture a tenth, government an eighth. About93 per cent of the
nation's net product, which is equivalent to its income, passed into
the hands of the public as consumption goods; only about7 per
cent was added to the stock of capital goods or to claims against
foreign countries. Of the goods flowing to consumers theprepon-
derant part—approximately 75 per cent_—consisted of services and
perishable commodities.
These remarkable data on the disposition of the net product of
our economic activity substitute quantitative approximations for
the vague conjectures with which earlier generations hadto do
their economic thinking. They fix our ideas about the order of
magnitude of different branches of production, of the incomesac-
cruing to the fortunate few and to the masses, of the goodscon-
sumed quickly and those consumed slowly, of the incomes received
by workers and men of property. In these variousways, and as far
as they go, the proportions I have cited delineate the structure of
our economy. But how dependable are the proportions? What
guide do they offer to the years ahead, once wartime dislocations
have been largely overcome? The figures for individualyears help
to answer these questions. They show that the compensation of
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employees has been a fairly steady proportion of the nation's in-
come. This proportion has not varied from, say, 20 per cent in one
year to 90 per cent in another, but has moved within a compara-
tively narrow range, never falling below 59 or rising above 74 per
cent between 1922 and 1938. Other components of national in-
come likewise show rough stability in their order of magnitude.
For example, dividends are a consistently small fraction of the
national income, at no time exceeding 8 per cent; the share of the
top i per cent bracket of the population is about one-eighth of the
total in every year covered; the share of agriculture in no year
exceeds a tenth, and the share of manufacturing stays within the
limits of 15 and 23 per cent. Capital formation is notoriously un-
stable, but is nevertheless a consistently small element in national
income: year in and year out the dominant part of our output has
moved into the hands of the public, in no year has this part fallen
below 88 per cent, and in some years the nation at large has even
dipped into its accumulated stockpile.2
This rough stability in the relations among different parts of the
national income during 1922-1938 is the more impressive because
I have made no distinction between years occupying different
stages of the business cycle, or even between the placid twenties
and the turbulent thirties. In view of the comparatively narrow
range within which the figures move, it seems reasonable to ex-
pect that once reconversion is fully accomplished, the broad divi-
sions of our national income will not be very different from the
prewar averages. For many purposes of economic analysis, this
rough and confident projection of prewar averages will suffice. No
student who accepts the figures as substantially accurate is likely
to think otherwise, unless he expects a revolutionary change in our
institutions, or is concerned with specific problems of economic
organization rather than its broad and abiding features.
III.FORECASTING BUSINESS CONDITIONS
The projection of national income in the years ahead or even in
the next twelve months poses a much more difficult problem than
the projection of the proportions in which national income is
divided. Past experience fails to furnish the forecaster with any
rule that is at once simple, objective, and trustworthy. Business
2 Pertinent figures for individual years are given in Kuznets' National Income and
Its Composition, 1919-1938(NationalBureau, 1941), Vol. r, Tables 12, 22, and in his
National Product since 1869 (National Bureau, 1946), Table i-i8. Data on the dis-
tribution by size are published in Kuznets' Shares of Upper Income Groups in
Income and Savings (National Bureau, 1952).
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conditions not only alternate between prosperity and depression,
but each cycle in business activity differs significantly from all its
predecessors. Between 1885 and 1914 there was some approach to
a 40-month cycle in the United States; this rough rule vanishes as
we move forward or backward. The shortest business cycle of
which we have a definite record lasted 17 months, the longest mi
months. Factory employment declined 5 per cent in one business
cycle contraction, 42 per cent in another; the range of cyclical de-
clines in factory payrolls runs from 5 to 65 per cent, in pig iron
production from 17 to 86 per cent, in industrial stock prices from
12 to 86 per cent. Exports parallel the movement of aggregate ac-
tivity in one business cycle, move inversely in another, haphazard-
ly in still another. Bank deposits rise during some business cycle
contractions, decline in others. The like is true of bank loans and
investments. Trading in corporate shares recovered ig months
earlier than general business activity in one instance, slumped 23
months earlier in another instance, recovered 7 months later in a
third, and slumped 4 months later in a fourth. At the peak of 1929
wholesale commodity prices reached a maximum io months before
industrial production; at the trough of 1938 their minimum point
came 14 months later.
At first glance it may seem impossible to extract any order what-
ever from such highly variable phenomena. Yet the studies by
Wesley Mitchell and his collaborators demonstrate that although
business cycles are decidedly less regular than theorists areprone
to assume, they are far more regular than observers preoccupied
with individual episodes commonly suppose. I may illustrate this
broad conclusion, which I think is basic to a true perspective, by
summarizing an experiment reported in Measuring Business
Cycles, another of last year's publications. The experimentwas per-
formed on seven highly significant series, extending back to the
1870's or earlier. Two series represented the production of durable
goods, two the money market, two the stock market, andone the
aggregate volume of transactions. When these series were examined
individually, very wide differences appeared in their behavior from
one business cycle to the next. The result was similar when the
behavior of the seven series during one business cyclewas com-
pared with their behavior during other business cycles. But when
the measures of each series were averaged for smallgroups of
cycles, whether on a chronological or some analytic plan, the idio-
syncrasies of the individual case tended to vanish. Theaverage
behavior of the same series in one group of cyclesas a rule turned
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Out to be very similar to its behavior in another group, the average
patterns of the several series became sharply differentiated within
each group, and the relations among the various series persisted
with great regularity from one group of cycles to the next; in other
words, a strong tendency towards repetition in the sequence of
different activities at revivals and recessions, and in the direction
and amplitude of their response to business cycles, came clearly
to the surface.
This experiment suggests an important conclusion: namely, that
although every business cycle is a unique historical episode, the
characteristic features of business cycles have been substantially
uniform in the long run. The experiment gives little or no sup-
port to the widely held view that depressions are becoming pro-
gressively more severe, or to the hypothesis that business cycles
succeed one another in a repetitive order that generates long
waves. Of course, findings based on a small group of series, how-
ever important they may be, cannot be regarded as conclusive.
But the present findings have already been tested informally on
numerous series; and whIle methodical testing is still necessary
and may turn up surprises, it can be said definitely that if, as seems
plausible a priori, business cycles actually have undergone secular
or structural or rhythmical changes, such changes have not im-
pressed themselves very clearly on statistical records and must be
small in comparison with the rather haphazard variation of suc-
cessive business cycles.
The monograph on Measuring Business Cycles foreshadows
other findings that may prove significant to economists and men
of affairs. I shall single out four that seem to me especially impor-
tant. (i) The volume of activity at the peak of a business cycle has
as a rule exceeded the level reached at the preceding peak. The
outstanding exception occurred in 1937 when activity fell short of
the 1929 peak; another exception apparently occurred in 1895.
(2)The amplitude of a business cycle expansion gives little or no
clue to the amplitude of the following contraction. On the other
hand, there is some tendency for the amplitude of a business cycle
expansion to be correlated positively with the amplitude of the
preceding contraction. The difference in the two relations reflects
the fact that the volume of activity has been decidedly more un-
even at successive troughs than at successive peaks of business
cycles. (3) While there is a broad tendency for economic activities
to fluctuate in unison, expansions and contractions run side by
side at every stage of a business cycle. The degree to which mdi-
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vidual processes resist a cyclical movement in aggregate activity
depends largely on its amplitude. In a mild business cycle expansion
or contraction, countercyclical movements are relatively numer-
ous. In a vigorous cyclical phase, on the other hand, few processes
run counter to the general tide. ()Duringan expansion in aggre-
gate activity the number of expanding processes tends to increase
for a time, then diminish; in other words, the number of expand-
ing processes tends to reach a maximum before the expansion in
aggregate activity itself culminates. Likewise, once a business cycle
contraction gets under way, it engulfs a wider and wider range of
activities; but in every stage of a general contraction some processes
keep expanding, and their number typically passes through a
minimum before aggregate activity itself turns up again.
These broad generalizations provide some clues to the maze of
irregularities in the actual course of events, and may prove helpful
in anticipating changes in the direction of aggregate activity. But
they also carry a warning against oversimplification of the problem
of forecasting business conditions. Possessing as it doesan excep-
tionally full record of cyclical fluctuations, the National Bureau
may render a valuable service by hunting for regularities where
there seems the best chance of finding them—not in the relations
between pairs or small groups of time series, or within the last few
years, but in the relations among numerous and varied activities
over decades. Early in 1938 we published a bulletin on statistical
indicators of cyclical revivals, which began by listing the attributes
of an 'ideal' indicator. Not one of the hundreds of time seriesex-
amined met all the specifications; but sincea carefully selected
group of series can be more reliable than any single series, we
segregated the series that had proved most trustworthy in thepast,
and presented the list in the hope that it might aidmen of judg-
ment to interpret the general drift of current conditions. In view
of later experience with the list, the gains in knowledge since it
was drawn up, and the heavy responsibilities of government under
the Employment Act of 1946, it has seemedour duty to undertake
a thorough revision of the earlier study and this time investigate
recessions as fully as revivals. The results of thenew study are
approaching completion and will be publishedas promptly as
possible.
In the meantime our exploration of the fundamentals ofbusi-
ness fluctuations is being pushed energetically. The first fruits of
Mills' study, which is unmasking the underlying featuresof the
cycles in prices, production, and sellers' receipts,were hrvestec1
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last year under the title Price-Quantity Interactions in Business
Cycles. Another valuable study is Mendershausen's Changes in
Income Distribution during the Great Depression. Several addi-
tional publications on business cycles may be expected this year or
next: Hultgren's analysis of costs, prices, and profits inthe railroad
industry; Moore's report on the interrelations between crop fluc-
tuations and business cycles; Ruth Mack's analysis of the processes
by which shifts in the demand for shoes are transmitted to earlier
productive and distributive stages; Evans' study of the ebb and
flow of business incorporations since the early days of the nine-
teenth century; Abramovitz' analysis of the processes whereby in-
ventories are built up and drawn down; Mills' full evidence on
the relations between the cyclical movements of prices and pro-
duction; Wolman's investigation of the behavior of wage rates at
recoveries and recessions; and Mitchell's progress report on what
typically happens in all leading economic activities during a busi-
ness cycle.
IV. TRENDS IN SPENDING AND SAVING
I suggested earlier that the proportions in which national income
is divided can be projected more reliably than the curve of na-
tional income itself. It may be objected that the contrast rests on a
simplification that for some purposes is intolerable. Surely, the
trade union strategist concerned with labor's precise share in
national income in the years ahead cannot rest content with a pro-
jection of prewar averages, nor can the farm specialist pondering
the role of agriculture in the national economy, or the fiscal expert
mapping the revenue needed to sustain the expanded sector of
governmental enterprise. Men faced with problems of this nature
will seek to take account of the slowly evolving changes in eco-
nomic organization that are concealed by averages for the inter-
war period. They will want to analyze secular trends over a still
longer time if possible, and give due weight to the changes wrought
by the war itself. Investigators who embark on such speculations
concerning future trends will find their task facilitated by Kuz-
nets' two volumes published last year—National Income: A Sum-
mary of Findings and National Product since 1869.
The latter monograph is devoted to a statistical analysis of the
growth of the American economy. In broad summary, aggregate
real income in the 1920's was almost eight times as large as in the
1870's, and per capita real income was almost three times as large.
The rate of growth was uneven, but every decade up to the 1930's
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registered substantial improvement. During that decadeper capita
income fell appreciably below the level of the i 920's; nevertheless
it was higher than in any other decade, and about two anda half
times as large as in the 1870's. What this amazing performance has
meant to the American people is suggested by Kuznets' division of
total output into the part that passed into the hands ofconsumers
and the part that was added to the nation's capital. Between 1869
and 1938 the out: ut of the American economy amountedto about
$2,800 billion in 1929 prices. Of this huge total, the flow ofcom-
modities and services to consumers accounted for fullygo per cent,
and this figure would be raised 2 points if residential buildings
were classified as consumer goods. The remaining 8 per cent in-
cludes new industrial plants, business structures, public improve-
ments, additions to inventories, and additions to claims against
foreign countries.
If these figures fail to excite the reader, thereason may well be
that Kuznets' findings concerning capital formation in the inter-
war period are now common knowledge. Before Kuznets' original
results were published, most economists had extremelyvague no-
tions about the relative magnitude of capital formation, andsome
actually believed that a great if not dominantpart of our rapidly
expanding industrial power was diverted to the building ofnew
houses, factories, roads, machinery, equipment, and other capital
goods. Kuznets demonstrated that therewas no foundation for this
opinion even in the experience of the 1920's, and hehas now ex-
tended the demonstration back to the Civil War.
It also appears from his new study that savingswere a nearly
constant fraction of the national income, decade after decade, be-
fore the i gao's. This result, if broadly valid, throwsnew light on
processes of spending and saving in a progressive economy. A typi-
cal speculative analysis of the savings problemstarts with the ob-
servation that the percentage of income going into savingstends
to rise as family income increases, then notes that the incomesof
families have risen generally and substantiallyover the years, and
ends by inferring that savings have beena steadily rising fraction
of national income. But accordingto Kuznets, that has not hap-
pened. Apart from possible complicationson the side of business
savings, the reason must be that the static tendencyof the savings-
income ratio to rise as family income increaseshas been counter-
acted historically by the tendency of the 'propensityto save' to de-
cline; that is, the average American family witha real income of
any given size has tended over the decades tosave a progressively
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smaller fraction of its income. Many influences have surelyworked
in this direction. The most important seem to have been, first, the
shift of population from rural to urban areas, second, therelative
decline of independent proprietors in the general scheme of entre-
preneurship, third, the increasing range of commodities and serv-
ices considered necessary for acceptable living standards.
The secular decline in the 'propensity to save,' so strongly sug-
gested although not directly demonstrated by Kuznets' calcula-
tions, has an obvious bearing on the long-run prospects of the
American economy. If the decline should continue, as seems not
unlikely, the prospect that our economy may be able to maintain
a generally high level of employment withoutprodigious private
investment or government spending is by no means so dark as
appears from some recent mathematicalprojections of national
income, which blink the secular element in the savings-income
relation.
V. THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
But secular trends can change on short notice, and the forecaster's
inescapable ordeal is to distinguish, somehow, the short-run move-
ments that release new trends from others, no less prominent, that
soon fade away. Ricardo saw the problem clearly.He warned his
contemporaries at the end of the Napoleonic War not to confuse a
temporary "revulsion of trade" with a "retrograde state ofsociety,"
but at the same time honestly added that "it would perhaps be
difficult to point out any marks by which they may be accurately
distinguished." That difficulty, unhappily, has not been erased by
time. During the 1920's some economists thought they had escaped
from it by embracing a 'law of growth,' and some today believe
they can do so by embracing a 'stable consumption function.' But
the signs are multiplying that, although the latter conception may
prove even more fruitful than has the former, the forecastsyielded
by the one can be just as misleading as those stemming from the
other.
The economic catastrophe of the 1930's continues to weigh
heavily in speculations about the future, but the simple fact is that
no one can tell today with any great confidence whetherthat ex-
perience defines a new trend of stagnation or a passing historical
episode. Kuznets' findings concerning the long-run trends of sav-
ings and consumption are reassuring. But once the present boom
has run its course, if the volume of investment should revert to
8Principlesof Political Economy, ed. Conner, p. 250.
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the level of the 1930'S, may not even a substantial decline in the
'propensity to save' prove insufficient to sustain the high level of
income that seems physically within our reach? The intense ac-
tivity of recent times has thinned the ranks of those who accept
the doctrine of secular stagnation. So too has the widespreadre-
alization that a huge backlog of replacements has accumulated in
industry, that years must pass before the housing shortage is elim-
inated, that vast opportunities for exporting capital may soon be-
come available, and that immeasurable investment outlets may be
opened up by aviation, radar, atomic energy, and other techno-
logical wonders. Nevertheless, the spectre of secular stagnation still
haunts the minds of some sensitive men as they look beyond the
next five or ten years. And while their dark forebodings are based
on an untested hypothesis of economic development, they cannot
be dismissed outright, as some believe possible, merely by citing
the investment opportunities afforded by foreign countries and by
technological innovations. For, on the one hand, foreign invest-
ment on a considerable scale is impossible in an atmosphere of
international distrust and, on the other hand, technologicalprog-
ress can go on at a rapid rate and investment still remain at an
unsatisfactory level.
The experience of the thirties abundantly illustrates both of
these statements, but I shall confine myself to the latter. Jacob
Gould's monograph on Output and Productivity in the Electric
and Gas Utilities, still another ofour publications last year, shows
that between 1929 and 1939 the outputper unit of labor increased
92 per cent in the electric light and power industry, and 20 per
cent in the manufactured gas industry. Other studies by Fabricant,
Barger, and their associates show gains of24 per cent in agricul-
ture, 26 per cent in coal mining, 33 per cent in manufacturing, and
32 per cent in steam railroads. Plainly, technological, progress
made rapid strides on a wide industrial front. In fact,as Gould
demonstrates, the reduction in unit labor requirements effected
by American industry during thei 930's was not very different from
the reductions achieved in preceding decades, at least since1900.
But before 1929 increasing efficiency in theuse of labor was gen-
erally accompanied by a rising trend in theaggregate number of
men employed, while in the following decade the ability of private
enterprise to create new jobs was drastically impaired and the in-
crease in technical power dissipated in mass unemployment.
4 See "Economic Research and the Keynesian Thinking of Our Times," Tablei,
above.
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The causes of this extraordinary setback to progress have been
extensively debated, but not thoroughly investigated. What part
did the decline in the rate of growth of population play? Did a
significant shift take place from capital-using to capital-saving in-
novations? Is there any validity in the hypothesis of an unfavorable
conjuncture of economic cycles with different wave lengths? In
what degree may monopolistic practices of business firms and
labor unions be held responsible? What part did the policies of
the New Deal play—with respect to taxation, borrowing, labor,
public utilities, the security markets? Were foreign developments
responsible in any significant degree for our economic plight? And
if so, in what measure did we export economic trouble before we
in turn imported it? Some of these questions are now being ex-
plored by Wolman in his studies of the labor market. The Con-
ference on Research in Fiscal Policy will consider others in a new
investigation of the influence of different types and levels of taxes
on business enterprise. But if I am right in thinkingthat a fuller
understanding of what happened in the 1930's may contribute
vastly to the shaping of wise economic policies in the future, there
is room in our program for a study which, while drawing exten-
sively on research now in process, is devoted specifically to the
problems and events of. that period.
To accomplish its purpose the study should rest on a broad in-
ductive foundation, and this must be sought in a comparative
analysis of earlier periods and other countries. As the research
work of the Bureau has taken shape, we have found it necessary
time and again to carry measurements back into the past. But the
economic experiences of foreign countries in recent years may
prove no less instructive than our own economic fortunes in a re-
mote past. And neither recent nor distant American experience
can be understood apart from foreign events. The importanceof
these methodological principles was fully recognized at the begin-
fling of our work on business cycles, and has not been neglected in
other parts of the Bureau's program. At present our 'foreign' re-
search includes Morgenstern's investigation of the financial rela-
tions among different countries during business cycles, Smit's study
of the phenomena connected with the international gold standard
during 1816-1914, Hultgren's study of transportation and Moore's
of crops in relation to the business cycles of Western Europe, Max-
well's survey of the development of fiscal relations between the
Dominion of Canada and its provinces, Higgins' study of British
banking and finance during the war, Long's study of the labor
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force in several countries, Bry's study of wages in Germany, and
Copeland's measurements of the flow of payments between the
United States and the rest of the world. Wide-ranging though
these studies are, they can provide onlya small part of the mate-
rials needed to interpret what happened in the United States dur-
ing the 1930's, to say nothing of the larger problem of America's
changing role in the world economy. Ifwe are to realize these
objectives, we must give more attention to foreign economies and
the links that tie us to them thanwe have in the past.
VI. ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES
One of the deepest trends in a country undergoing rapid indus-
trialization is the relative shrinkage of the commodity-producing
industries taken as a whole. This trendappears clearly in Kuznets'
industrial breakdown of the national income in the United States,
and stands out still more prominently in the longer serieson the
labor force. In 1870 agriculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing,
mining, and construction together accounted for 76per cent of the
labor force; their combined percentage fellto 68 in 1900, to 6i in
1920, and to 48 in 1940. If the miscellaneous category thatmars
statistical tables on the labor force is counted with the commodity-
producing group, obviously a doubtful statistical expedient,the
percentage in 1940 rises from 48 only to55. If transportation and
public utilities are also lumped in their entirety with thecom-
modity group, another doubtful expedient, thepercentage is still
only 62. The remaining 38per cent of the labor force in 1940
was scattered in trading and financial establishments,a great
variety of private services, and ingovernment work. During the
war the commodity-producing sector expanded sharply, but the
services now seem to be reasserting their secular force.
These facts have not as yet been fully assimilated inour think-
ing. Treatises on economic theory continueto be written as if
manufacturing and the extractive industrieswere the only ones
of any consequence. With important exceptionsmuch the same
emphasis is found in journalistic writings,governmental policies,
and even official statistics. But if technologicalprogress in the
commodity-producing industries continuesat anything like the
pace felt during the past half century, will not the service industries
soon become the primary source of employment? Maywe expect
the services to expand sufficientlyto fill the 'gap' between those
5Basedon estimates by Daniel Carson in a paper presented at the National Bu-
reau's Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, November1946.
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needed in the commodity-producing industries and the total labor
force? To what extent is technological progress likely in mer-
chandising establishments, financial businesses, personal service
industries, the private professions, and government work? What
are the implications of the growth of the serviceindustries for the
problem of monopoly? What are the implications for the problem
of business cycles? What is the cultural incidence of the changing
character of the labor force? Are our institutions flexible enough
to prevent a hierarchy of special privileges from beingamassed by
aggressive sections of the commodity-producing group?
To cope with these and related questions, factual information
on the service sector of the economy is essential. Butthe service
industries are a vast conglomerate, including activities as diverse
as specialized medicine, on the one hand, and streetsweeping, on
the other. Neither the social significance of the penetration of the
service industries, nor their capacity for further expansion, can
be accurately gauged from broad aggregates. For example, the
number of physicians was 157 per ioo,ooo persons in 1900, and
only 133 in 1940. In 1900 there were 1,980 servants per ioo,ooo
persons, in 1940 only 1,590. On the other hand, the numberof
public school teachers increased faster than population, yet not so
fast as the entire class of government workers. According to Fabri-
cant's estimates, government employees constituted 4.5 per cent
of the labor force in l9oo; this percentage doubled by 1940 and
on July i, 1946 one out of every ten workers was on some govern-
mental payroll.
These illustrative data emphasize both the importance of an-
alyzing trends in the service industries, and the need of examining
them individually. Among our recent publications is the highly
original monograph on Income from Independent Professional
Practice by Friedman and Kuznets. Initiated by Kuznets, who in
the course of work on national income had felt keenly the lack of
data on the services, this study was executed mainly by Friedman.
A second publication on the service industries is last year's Occa-
sional Paper by Stigler, which presents some very useful informa-
tion on the number, incomes, and working conditions of domestic
servants—a class of workers hitherto neglected by professional
economists, although before the war they were as numerous as the
employees of railroads, coal mines, and automobile factories com-
bined. Other monographs now being prepared will deal in detail
with education, trade, and government, as well as the service in-
dustries in their entirety.
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VII. THE CHANGING FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Financial institutions rank low among the service industriesas
employers of labor, but they exercise great influenceon the econ-
omy by their activities of lending, investing, and providing the
community with means of payment. In 1900a typical commercial
bank might still have been describedas performing the classical
functions of deposit, discount, and note issue. Atpresent that
description can only excite historical interest. Thepower of note
issue, barred for all practical purposes to state banks since the
Civil War, is no longer exercisedeven by national banks. The
place once occupied by short-term commercial loans in theport-
folio of a commercial bank has been preempted by federal securi-
ties. Total loans and discounts of commercial banks in 1946were
considerably below the level reached in1929, despite the great
increase in production and the rise in prices. Investments in fed-
eral obligations, on the other hand, have soared inrecent years.
At the end of June 1946 they accounted forover go per cent of
the investments held by commercial banks, and investments in
their turn were more than three timesas large as loans.
The enormous volume of securitiesnow tucked away in the
vaults of commercial banks represents largelya monetization of
the federal debt. But in looking to the future, it is importantto
bear in mind that the recent war accentuateda trend long in the
making. Government securities first becamea considerable factor
in commercial bank assets during World War I. In the 1920'scom-
mercial banks did not increase their holdings of federal obligations
materially; however, the holdings of other securities expanded
much faster than loans, and as aconsequence loans diminished
relative to investments. During the Great Depression loanswere
sharply deflated; but government obligations offset the shrinkage
in other securities, and investmentsas a whole changed little. In
1934 investments of commercial banks outstripped loans for the
first time. Banks added heavily to their federal securities between
1934 and 1939, and by the end of the latter year investments ex-
ceeded loans by 36 per cent. During the next sixyears both loans
and investments increased, but the growth of investmentswas much
faster. Last year investments declined appreciably, but thedrop is
of slight significance, since the Treasury merely used its swollen de-
posits in commercial banks to retirea sizable block of its securities.
The momentous changes in the functions of commercial banks
since 1900 are analyzed by Jacoby and Saulnier in their monograph
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on Business Finance and Banking, whichhas just been published.
The authors of this scholarly study focus attention on the changing
relations between business concerns and commercial banks. In ex-
ploring the causes of the relative decline of 'commercial lending'
since the 1920's, they analyze, first, the changes in the industrial
composition of the economy to which I referred earlier in this
reporf; next, changes in the size of business enterprises, in the
types of assets held by business concerns, and in thecompetitive
framework within which commercial banks have functioned. The
study makes an important contribution to the understanding of
how business, as well as banking, practices have developed in re-
cent decades.
The provision of means of payment is the one function that
commercial banks today discharge much as they did in 1900. It is
a curious fact that despite the widespread andpersistent interest
of economists in the supply of money, current monthly measures
of the aggregate supply of means of payment have become avail-
able only in the last few years. A historical background for inter-
preting the new official compilations on the public's currency
holdings is provided by the recently published Technical Paper
by Anna Schwartz and Elma Oliver, which presents monthly esti-
mates of currency held by the public since 1917.Wehope that
this statistical record may soon be supplemented by another show-
ing, month by month, the public's holdings of deposits.
However important statistics on the supply of money may be,
it is difficult to interpret them apart from measures of the turn-
over of money. The common impression that the supplyof money
fluctuates in close harmony with aggregate economic activity is
not supported by a long view of history. That much seems firmly
established by our investigation of business cycles, as is also the
great sensitivity of the turnover of money to fluctuations in aggre-
gate activity. In our studies of business cycles we have hitherto
relied heavily on approximations of the aggregate supply of money,
its average rate of use, and the aggregate volume of payments. We
have been unable to differentiate sufficiently the stocks of money
held or the payments made by leading groups of transactors in the
economy. This gap in statistical information has been abarrier to
scientific progress, but there is a prospect that Copeland's experi-
ments in tracing the flow of money may soon improve matters.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has recog-
nized the high importance of his undertaking and will attempt, in
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collaboration with the National Bureau, to develop statisticson
the flow of money on a current basis.
In tracing money flows Copeland presents information on the
debt and credit position, as well as the amounts paid and received,
for each of various groups of transactors. For one category of debt,
corporate bonds, the National Bureau has for some time sheltered
in its files a virtual census, starting in igoo. Analysis of thisex-
traordinary body of information was begun last year under Hick-
man's direction. One of the principal aims of the new project is
to develop investment experience tables that may serve as a guide
for evaluating securities and establishing lossreserves. Related
studies of risk experience with mortgages are being conducted by
Saulnier and his associates. If these investigationsprosper, the
fickleness of individual securities may be no obstacle in the future
to tolerable forecasts of security experience in the mass.
VIII. THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT
One reason for the decline of 'the commercial loan' in bankport-
folios is the expansion of government and its heavy reliance in
recent years on borrowing. Indeed, the outstanding trend in the
service sector of our economy has been the growth ofgovernment.
The figures on employment that I cited earlierare merely impor-
tant symptoms. They include regular civilian employees ofgov-
ernment, but omit the employment afforded by private industry
on account of governmental purchases. They do not even include
military personnel or workers onemergency public projects. And,
of course, no employment figure, however comprehensive,can
give any inkling of the influence of intereston the public debt, or
of payments to veterans, or of financial aidto foreign countries, to
say nothing of the influence exercised by government on the eco-
nomic life of the nation through nonfiscal devices.
The colossal wartime expenditures ofgovernment have now
abated. Also, the pervasive controls of private industryare being
lifted, and free markets reestablished. Buta very large part of the
nation's income continues to flow throughgovernment channels.
The ratio of government expenditures (inclusive of so-calledtrans-
fer payments) to the gross national product, whichwas 20 per cent in i9androse to 52 per cent in 1944, was still about35 per
cent in 1946.Afurther reduction may reasonably be expected
during the next few years, but the figure is likelyto remain above
the prewar level. However loudly the publicmay grumble about
taxes, there is no easy escape from the fiscal problem facing the
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nation. In a careful analysis of the federal budget, now nearing
completion, Crum and Kendrick have reached the conclusion that
federal expenditures during the first postwar decade may well
average $32 billion per year [in 1947 prices]. If stateand local out-
lays are added in, government expenditures may approach the $45
billion mark.
The recent shift of the political tide in this country may check
the government's part in the economy of the nation, but it seems
unlikely that the reduction will be large or permanent. The size
of the public debt and the obligation to veterans work strongly
against curtailment of governmental activity; so too do the as-
sumption of responsibility for a high level of employment, the
growing awareness of the needs of underprivileged groups, the
continuance of international rivalry and friction, the spread of
collectivism abroad, and our own tradition of governmental inter-
vention. The practical question is not whether the government
need play an important part in the nation's economic life, but
how that part will be played. Under the circumstances, the Na-
tional Bureau can make a useful contribution to public policy by
subjecting large governmental activities to objective study. The
investigations now being conducted by Crum, Seltzer, Smith, and
their associates of the Conference on Research in Fiscal Policy are
a step in this direction. So also is Fabricant'sinvestigation of
trends in government employment, as well as Colean's study of the
influence of government on urban real estate finance.
The novel statement of federal finances devised by Copeland
in the course of his experimental tracings of the flow of money is
a welcome addition to our inadequate kit of toolsfor analyzing
fiscal policies. This statement makes available for the first time a
clear and comprehensive record of federal fiscal operations, and
will be published promptly as a Technical Paper. The statement
combines transactions of public service enterprises, credit agencies,
and insurance funds with general federal operations. It shows
dealings with the public, not interagency transactions; in short, it
gives the sort of information needed to trace the impact of fiscal
operations on the economy. If plans for developing the data on a
current basis materialize, as now seems likely, economists will gain
a new weapon in their struggle with 'the shape ofthings to come.'
IX.FORECASTINGAND ECONOMIC POLICY
Economists are now engaged in a lively discussion of the business
outlook. At no time since the 1920'S have forecasters been so out-
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spoken, insistent, and self-confident. Strong in faith, they address
their predictions—sometimes in ordinary prose, sometimes in eso-
teric symbols—not only to business executives and the stock-buy-
ing public, but also and preeminently to government itself. To-
day's forecasters have enormous advantages over their predecessors:
keener analytic tools, longer and better statistical records, sounder
analyses of past experience. These stepping stones towards the
future will become firmer with time, but two serious difficulties
are likely to remain in the forecaster's path: first, the imperfect
tendency of history to repeat itself; second, the forecaster's own
hopes and fears about the future, which tend to insinuate them-
selves into his predictions, no matter how elaborate their statistical
or mathematical scaffolding
The recent outburst of articulate forecasting will bear careful
watching. A scientific investigator can learn nothing from the in-
tuitive prophet, whether his forecasts prove true or false. On the
other hand, the forecasters who are now devising ingenious theo-
retical models may contribute significantly to economic science,
even if many of their forecasts prove wrong. The economist who
values truth must discriminate conscientiously among false proph-
ets, but it is also his duty to warn men of affairs that they cannot
safely practice similar tolerance. At our Twenty-fifth Anniversary
celebration last June, Joseph S. Davis stressed the need for wider
recognition of the nature of economic forecasts. Hissage re-
marks deserve repetition: "In economics...reallyscientific pre-
dictions are usually impossible except as statements of whatcan
be expected under a certain combination of assumptions. Such
specialized predictions have their place, but theyare too easily
confused with outright prophecies. The assumptions underlying
the forecasts, and the margin of error in them, typically deserve
as much weight as the forecasts themselves, if the users and in-
deed the authors are not to be misled. But there is greater need
of warning that certain forecasts cannot be made withina margin
of error small enpugh to warrant serious reliance upon them. This
is true of many forecasts—of crops, of food supply and demand,
of labor force and unemployment, and even of populationsome
decades ahead. Policies cannot soundly be basedupon specific
forecasts of this type, or an average of them, but ought to take
account of a considerable range of possibilities."6
The question now agitating many people is when the next down-
6EconomicResearch and the Development of Economic Science and Public
Policy (National Bureau, 116),pp.187-188.The italics are mine.
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turn in business will come, and how far it willtake us. Men in
high stations have made reassuring statements on these matters,
and they are likely to multiply in coming months, especially if
the downturn occurs. Unfortunately, the benevolent pronounce-
ments rarely rest on firm knowledge. The paramount lessonof
experience is that the only perfectly regular feature of business
cycles is the recurrence of the phenomenon itself. For well over a
century business cycles have run an unceasing round. Theyhave
persisted through vast economic and social changes; they have
withstood countless experiments in industry, agriculture, banking,
industrial relations, and public policy; they have confounded
forecasters without number, belied repeated prophecies of a 'new
era of prosperity,' and outlived repeated forebodings of'chronic
depression.' Men who wish to serve democracy faithfully must
recognize that the roots of business cycles go deep in our economic
organization, that the ability of government to control depressions
adequately is not yet assured, that our power of forecasting is
limited, and that true foresight requires policies for coping with
numerous contingencies.
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